After a year of Israel’s brutal war, it’s important to remember that the war didn’t break out because Israel wanted it. The war is Israel’s response to Hamas’s barbaric raid on civilian settlements, and Hezbollah is the one who opened fire on northern Israel the day after Hamas’s attack.
Behind the outbreak of war stood the Iranian dream and practical preparations for its realization, with a clear purpose: to bring about Israel’s collapse and destruction. To this end, Iran conceived and implemented the “Ring of Fire” strategy around Israel, which included building Hamas’s military capability in Gaza and Hezbollah’s more extensive capability in Lebanon.
A coordinated campaign from all fronts where terror movements were built with Iranian assistance was supposed to destroy Israel. At the same time, Iran was meant to remain behind the scenes, 1,500 km away from Israel, without being implicated.
However, Hamas leader Yahya Sinwar, later killed by the Israel Defence Forces (IDF), didn’t wait to implement the Iranian plan and started the war without coordination with other “Ring of Fire” components. Perhaps he felt pressured by the advancing talks between Saudi Arabia and Israel, maybe he felt a solid religious duty and feared that continued economic progress in Gaza would interfere with his future plans, or he might have felt strong and well-prepared – while Israel appeared weak with its army torn apart by internal strife. The publication of the laser defense system timeline might have also accelerated Sinwar’s actions. Perhaps all these factors played a mixed role in his decision – we can’t know for sure.
If he had assumed that the Iranians, Hezbollah, and the Palestinian Brotherhood in the West Bank would join the war with full force, he made a massive mistake – in many ways, a critical error.
Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah (also later killed by the IDF), as the senior figure in the “resistance” array against Israel, couldn’t sit idle but also couldn’t risk a major war without preparation and after losing the element of surprise. Therefore, Hezbollah joined the fighting minimally and at a high cost, as the connection to Gaza affected its decision flexibility. Over nearly a year, it lost considerable capabilities, especially in southern Lebanon (secretly, the IDF used this time to prepare for the invasion of Lebanon, including through special forces operating in Lebanese territory).
On what we call the “Beeper Night,” when those holding the activation mechanism faced a use-it-or-lose-it crisis and decided to push the button – the war in Lebanon also began in full force on Israel’s initiative. Days earlier, Israel successfully completed the first phase of the ground operation in Gaza, dismantling and destroying Hamas’s military capabilities. Thus, with almost perfect timing between sectors, Israel, even if by chance, became free to deal with the threat from the north right before the “Beeper Night.”
While many Hamas terrorists are still alive in Gaza, Hamas there is no longer relevant as a threat to Israel. It still fights with its remaining forces against the IDF inside the Strip as a guerrilla organization with small coordination capability. Still, no one asked themselves how Hamas in Gaza would react to the elimination of Sinwar, its leader. Hamas’s only success is its ability to hold Israeli and other hostages.
As a new administration enters office in Washington, it’s appropriate to present the nature and goals of Israel’s war in various sectors to clarify where it’s heading in the coming years. We hope these efforts will work together with the new administration.
The war Israel is conducting operates on four levels:
A. The personal security of Israeli citizens in the Gaza border area, the Galilee, and throughout the country.
B. Israel’s status in the region and the world. Those who wished it harm saw October 7 as the beginning of the end of the Jewish state, and Israel lost its status as a regional power. Therefore, the war’s results must enable a process of Israel’s return to its status. Anyone who smelled Israel’s spilled blood and thought to exploit it – needs to see that those who spilled its blood were dismembered and became irrelevant.
C. The heart and mind of Muslims in the region. This war’s results need to make clear to the world, especially the Muslim world, that radical Islamic movements, both Sunni and Shiite, bring disaster to their people and destruction to their believers. An Israeli failure would lead to the spread of Islamic struggle beyond the Middle East – “the West is next” isn’t an empty slogan but an action plan.
D. This is an inter-axis war, so it was important for the U.S. to clarify that it stands beside its ally and that opposing the China-Moscow-Tehran-Hamas-Hezbollah-North Korea axis stands the strong Washington-Jerusalem-Riyadh-Abu Dhabi/Dubai-Jordan axis.
In the war against Hezbollah, there’s an important additional component: Hezbollah was Iran’s most robust proxy, and damaging Hezbollah, the more complex, the better, will also weaken Iran.
After Iran fired hundreds of missiles of various types toward Israel twice, the actual state of Iran’s military power was revealed, and effectively, the Iranian strategy collapsed. The “messengers” were severely hurt and are no longer valuable tools in Iran’s hands. The Israeli operation on the night of October 26, in which about 20 targets in Iran were hit, made clear to the Iranians the price of direct confrontation with Israel and Iran’s weakness against the capabilities Israel demonstrated.
Contrary to claims that no strategic framework can be discerned in Israel’s various actions, it appears that even if no formal policy document describing this was issued, there are guiding principles for Israel’s action, some probably shaped during the war:
A. Israel isn’t operating as in previous wars for “threat postponement” on its borders but based on the understanding that threats must be destroyed (Hamas) or at least drastically change their intensity (Hezbollah). Before entering Gaza, the cabinet’s directive to the military made this very clear.
B. Israel prefers to concentrate on one arena as much as possible. Therefore, it decided not to attack a very tempting target in Lebanon in the war’s first week, understanding that priority should be given to fighting in Gaza. For this reason, Israel also didn’t hurry to respond strongly to Iran after the significant Iranian attack in April – because the IDF was very busy in Gaza, and the fate of the war in Lebanon wasn’t clear. Even for intensive war in Lebanon, the IDF only entered after dismantling Hamas’s military wing, meaning the end of the intensive campaign in Gaza. Still, once it did, all of Hezbollah’s leadership was destroyed with full force.
C. The third principle is not to determine what Israel will do in the future before current achievements enable the implementation of the discussed plan. Therefore, who would be responsible for the civilian system in Gaza “the day after” wasn’t determined because such a determination would have added an opinionated partner to Gaza’s complicated complex, and anyway, no entity can/wants to enter Gaza as long as Hamas isn’t drastically weakened inside the Strip? Also, Lebanon’s force that could deal with Hezbollah has yet to rise. Therefore, due to the same principle, Israel has yet to publish any information about the future of southern Lebanon or what it wants to achieve in the north beyond returning its residents. A declaration that outlines a clear direction for the IDF but doesn’t indicate any political characterization. The only public declaration was that negotiations would be conducted under fire and no ceasefire for talks.
Nevertheless, I’ll try to outline what Israel needs to achieve in the end, after the war, despite calls for formal Israeli initiative in Lebanon or Gaza being called into the void without addressees.
Israel’s goals should be defined as follows:
In Gaza, it’s most important to bring about the release of the hostages by force or agreement. In parallel, the IDF needs to “produce” a kind of Area A from the entire Gaza Strip, similar to existing Area A territories in the West Bank, although it’s not yet clear who will take the civilian role in Gaza. It should be an Arab force that will contribute to rehabilitation, clearing the area of weapons, and different education – but security control will remain with the IDF. However, there will be no Israeli settlement in the Strip.
In Lebanon, two achievements must be secured: Southern Lebanon must be an area with no Hezbollah personnel and no Hezbollah infrastructure—a “buffer zone” mostly without residents and without any entity threatening Israel. I believe the IDF will oversee this, as UNIFIL is an organization without capability. The buffer zone’s purpose is to prevent flat-trajectory fire toward Israeli settlements and to push Hezbollah’s ground forces beyond the range capable of surprising in the style of October 7. In Lebanon as a whole, the Air Force needs to hit Hezbollah’s firepower and infrastructure severely. This is until the organization is reduced to such a low threat level that it allows the creation of a free operation space for the Air Force in an area including both Syria and Lebanon. What the IDF did in Syria in the last dozen years needs to be done in the future in both countries as one (extended campaign between wars). The goal after the war is to continue degrading Hezbollah’s capabilities and not allow it to strengthen.
In Syria, any discovered Iranian infrastructure must be hit, and Assad must be brought to reduce or give up Iranian presence significantly.
Israel shouldn’t take it upon itself to deal with the Houthi threat or enter a mess with Iraq, despite Iranian militias occasionally operating against it from Iraqi territory. It’s better to make clear to the Iraqi government that Iraq will pay the price for hosting Iranians operating against Israel. Two or three covert operations against economically significant Iraqi facilities will do the desired. In Yemen, more infrastructure targets should be treated like the Hodeidah port, but no more than that.
Iran is a great challenge for the future, a multi-year challenge. The latest attack in Iran was a correct step for now, but facing the Iranian challenge, Israel will need to organize itself differently. As long as this regime remains in Iran, Israel will know no rest, as its commitment to destroy it is genuine and sincere.
How will the future look for Israel?
If Israel continues to act with wisdom, determination, and patience – then in about a year, in my assessment, Gaza will be a threat like that which exists today from Jenin or Tulkarem. Galilee residents will return to their homes, and the Air Force will operate in Lebanon in the way it operated in Syria during the last dozen years, with Hezbollah occasionally trying to fire individual missiles against Israel – and these will be intercepted by Israel’s defense systems, including by the laser that will enter service and ease (as a complementary means) the economic burden of interception.
Israel will focus on a long-term campaign against Iran. It is a serious, intelligent, and dangerous enemy at a great distance, and therefore, the main risk it can create is the one stemming from its missile capability and certainly if it has nuclear weapons in the future. The military must concentrate on these two components and undermine the regime. Iran must not be allowed to build new or renewed threats around Israel’s borders, even at the cost of war.
In Israel’s north as in its south, Israel must invest many resources to build the Gaza envelope and the north of the country in a way that creates a more robust, flourishing, and prosperous civilian space.
The broader diplomatic move should focus on renewing complementary efforts to the “Abraham Accords,” meaning expanding Israel’s connections throughout the Middle East and beyond and formalizing them. A strong Israel – that emerged from the October 7 crisis severely hurt its enemies, proved its internal and military strength and renewed its economic prosperity – will be an essential component in building a different Middle East. A region where Iran has no strong proxies and Iran itself struggles to deal with long-range warfare against Israel and its allies. This situation will strengthen the US’s position in the Middle East and allow it to rely on Israel when it needs to focus on other regions in the world.
As long as the fighting continues, preparing the diplomatic move behind the scenes is right. After the end of the military chapter (which needs about a year of exhaustion time in Gaza), it should be developed with great momentum. This is where the international community, especially the US, can greatly contribute to stabilizing and prospering the Middle East.
What’s presented here regarding the future is based on what’s acceptable to show in large projects as “success-oriented,” meaning an optimistic future that doesn’t consider mistakes and failures. Of course, the future isn’t exactly as I have described it, but it needs to be painted clearly to understand what to aspire to and what’s right to plan and do.
IDF MG (ret.) Yaakov Amidror is a Distinguished Fellow with the Jewish Institute for National Security of America and former National Security Advisor to Israel’s Prime Minister.
Originally Published in The Jerusalem Post.